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GEO. WALTON GREEN, *Secretary*.    GEO. WM. CULPER, *President*.

## TO BUSINESS MEN.

A SPECIMEN OF MR. BLAINE'S DIPLOMACY—IS HE A SAFE MAN TO TRUST AS  
PRESIDENT?

BY D. DE LEON, ESQ.

The powers conferred by the Constitution upon the Executive enable him to shape the foreign policy of this nation almost independent of the Legislature. A scheming and unscrupulous President can involve the country in serious complications, commit it to an unwise policy, or at least render its foreign diplomacy ridiculous before Congress may have an opportunity to check him.

Of all the questions that our Department of State had to deal with in the year 1881, during the Secretaryship of Mr. Blaine, the most weighty for our country and continent were those growing out of the war in which Chili, Peru and Bolivia were then engaged; and all those questions centered around the important point of the recognition of the government of Dr. Francisco Garcia Calderon, whom a small assemblage of residents at Lima and Callao attempted to put up as President of Peru after Piérola, the Dictator, and the only recognized government of Peru, had left the Capital upon the approach of the Chilian forces.

In May of that year Mr. Blaine sent the following dispatch to Mr. Christiancy, the United States Minister at Lima:

No. 143]

Department of State,  
Washington, May 9, 1881

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Sir—In your last dispatch, No. —, you informed this Department that the Chilian Government refused absolutely to recognize General Piérola as representing the civil authority in Peru, and that Señor Calderon was at the head of a provisional government.

If the Calderon Government is supported by the character and intelligence of Peru and is really endeavoring to restore constitutional government with a view both to order within and negotiation with Chili for peace, you may recognize it as the existing provisional government, and render what aid you can by advice and good offices to that end.

Mr. Elmore has been received by me as the confidential agent of such provisional government.

I am, etc.,

James G. Blaine.

As Mr. Blaine's reception of Mr. Elmore, as the agent of Calderon left Mr. Christiancy no choice but to recognize Calderon; as the recognition of Calderon by the United States was a step of transcendent importance to the future of the three belligerents, as it brought the United States on the verge of a foreign war, and as Mr. Blaine leaves in blank the No. of the last dispatch in which he says Mr. Christiancy informed the Department that Señor Calderon was at the head of a provisional government, it is of interest to look back over Mr. Christiancy's correspondence from the time Calderon appeared upon the political stage and ascertain which in fact were the views communicated to the Department by Mr. Christiancy regarding the status of the Calderon government down to May 9, 1881, when Mr. Blaine authorized his recognition.

On February 25, 1881, dispatch No. 245, Mr. Christiancy wrote to the Department as follows:

\* \* \* "I have the honor to inform you that since then the Chilian authorities here have definitely determined not to treat with Piérola, at present the only recognized government of Peru, recognized by all the other governments who have representatives here, and by Chili herself by treating with him at Arica.

"A movement has therefore been initiated among some of the leading citizens of Lima and Callao, and encouraged by the Chilian authorities, to establish a new government in opposition to that of Piérola (who is still at Tarma or Jauja). And at a meeting of 110 of those citizens, Mr. Francisco Garcia Calderon was, by a fair majority of that meeting, declared to constitute, to use their own language, the 'unipersonal government' of Peru.

"At a superficial glance this would seem to be an attempt to get rid of one dictatorship clearly adopted by the people of the whole Peruvian Republic, and recognized by foreign governments, including Chili, for a new dictatorship,

adopted by the majority of a self-constituted meeting of 110 men of Lima and Callao, and recognized as yet by nobody else except Chili. In this aspect merely, it would of course, be simply ludicrous.

“But the intention, as professed by this new ‘unipersonal government,’ and by the Chilian newspaper here \* \* \* is that this movement for the establishment of a new government shall be submitted in some form to the people of Peru; that an appeal shall be made to the people, who shall be invited to sanction this government until a Congress can be called together to ratify it or to establish another in some form. And, of course, if the people of Peru choose to ratify or concur in this or any other form of government, it must then be considered legitimate and acknowledged as such. But Chili does not intend to accept any treaty as final without its ratification by a Peruvian Congress, though she may in the meantime agree upon a provisional treaty with this merely provisional government, only to be submitted to and ratified by a congress.

\* \* \* “If the appeal to the people succeeds in securing the popular support, peace (upon such terms as Chili may choose to dictate) will probably be the result.

“But if, as I fear may happen, the people of only a part of Peru may approve, and those of any considerable portion should still adhere to Piérola, the result would be likely to prove calamitous indeed to Peru, producing a civil war in addition to the war with Chili. \* \* \*

\* \* \* “In the proposed appeal to the people by the new provisional or proposed provisional government, I think it probable that the portion of Peru west of the Andes will ratify the movement.” \* \* \*

On March 9, 1881, dispatch No. 254, Mr. Christiancy wrote to the Department as follows:

“The attempt to form a new Peruvian government here in opposition to that of Piérola, described in my dispatch No. 245, seems from present appearances to have utterly failed. Mr. F.G. Calderon found great difficulty in getting proper ministers to hold office under him; but when he finally thought he had got this arranged, he, for the first time, as it would seem, began to inquire how far his Chilian friends meant to allow his government to govern.

“He requested that the Chilian army should be withdrawn from the city of Lima, that he should be allowed to occupy the government palace and raise over it the Peruvian flag, and that he should be allowed to control the Custom-house and the collection of duties, etc., all of which was refused; whereupon, as I understand, his proposed ministers refused to act, and he himself was disposed to decline the task of forming a government. It is now again reported that he has not finally given up the attempt, but as yet nothing definite has resulted.”

On March 16, 1881, dispatch No. 257, Mr. Christiancy wrote to the Department as follows:

“Referring to my dispatch No. 254, in reference to the attempt to form a new government of Peru, under the auspices of the Chilian authorities, I have the honor now further to inform you that the attempt, though for a time apparently abandoned, has since been persisted in, and on the 12th instant that new government was installed in the small hamlet (too small to be called a village) of Magdalena, about three miles from Lima, which has been declared neutral territory.” \* \* \*

“As Piérola still claims to be the government of Peru, the great question for me and other ministers here to decide is that of recognition, all having heretofore recognized Piérola. My own view is that I cannot recognize this new professional {provisional} government until it shall appear to be a government of Peru, instead of Lima and Calloa.”

On March 23, 1881, dispatch No. 264, Mr. Christiancy wrote to the Department as follows:

“I have the honor to inform you that Señor Manuel M. Galvez, the Secretary of Foreign Relations under the new government, set up or attempted to be set up for Peru, called to see me yesterday \* \* \*

“He then inquired what I thought of the policy of sending a special envoy to the United States. I frankly told him that I saw but one objection to this, and that this might be but temporary, viz., that as yet it did not sufficiently appear that this new government was *the* government of *Peru*, and that until this should appear, the United States might not be willing to recognize it as such; that inasmuch as our government, with all the other governments represented here, had recognized the government of Piérola, I should myself, in the absence of instructions to the contrary, be compelled to wait until it should appear by vote or acquiescence of the people of Peru that the majority approved or acquiesced in the new government, and that I was inclined to think my government would be likely to take the same view of the question; and that, as yet, I had seen no sufficient evidence of this approval or acquiescence, but that the very moment I should have such evidence I should recognize the new government without waiting for instructions, and that all our government wished to know was *what* is the government of Peru, when they would at once recognize it; but they could not make themselves parties in a contest between two governments, both claiming to be the government of Peru, until the people of Peru had decided that question for themselves, etc.”

On March 31, 1881, dispatch No. 273, Mr. Christiancy wrote to the Department as follows:

“SIR—Referring to my dispatch No. 264, I have now to inform you that, from all present appearances, the new Peruvian government, of which Mr. Garcia Calderon is the head, does not seem likely to be recognized by the people of Peru; and so far as any manifestations of the popular will have come to my knowledge, the mass of the people seems likely to continue its adherence to the Dictator Piérola. Circumstances yet to occur may change all this; but as yet, from the best information I can get, the very localities on whose concurrence the new government counted, still adhere to Piérola, and even here in Lima, the municipal Government, at a meeting held yesterday, unanimously decided not to recognize it; and when the Alcalde (Mayor) went to consult the Chilian Secretary of War at the palace, he was informed that the Chilian government did not yet recognize the new government (waiting, doubtless, to see that it should first be recognized by the people of Peru). And when the Alcalde asked what the municipal government should do in case the new pretended government should demand the building of the municipality and seek to turn them out, the Secretary of War replied, in substance, that he did not know, but that if any disturbance of the peace should take place in a quarrel between the new government and the municipal authorities, he should send them all alike to prison.”

On April 4, 1881, dispatch No. 277, Mr. Christiancy wrote to the Department as follows:

“SIR—Referring to my dispatches Nos. 257, 264 and 273, in reference to the question, What is the government of Peru? I have now the honor further to inform you that since my dispatch No. 273, the Alcalde (Mayor of the old municipality under the Piérola government) refused to carry out the unanimous resolution of the municipal Council, and allowed the Council of 1879 to come in and take possession, in accordance with the decree of the provisional government of Garcia Calderon. I will further say that this is the only indication, since the above dispatches, of the acceptance of the provisional government of Peru.

“Even the northern provinces, upon which it counted (and where, I supposed, the terror of the Chilian arms would have secured the adherence of the people), seem to be overwhelmingly opposed to the provisional government of Calderon and to adhere to Piérola. This is also the case in the South. \* \* \* \* At present all the indications are that nearly all the inhabitants east of the Andes still adhere to Piérola, and that the same is the fact with the majority between the mountains and the coast.

“Each of the governments (so-called) has called a Congress.”

On April 13, 1881, dispatch No. 283, Mr. Christiancy wrote to the Department as follows:

“SIR—Referring to my dispatch No. 277, upon the question, What constitutes the government of Peru? I have the honor to inform you that nothing has since occurred which contributes to change the aspect of the question. \* \* \* \* The evidence, as yet, is quite clear that the overwhelming majority of the people of Peru are opposed to the provisional government, and still adhere to Piérola, and at present, if the Chilian army should leave to-morrow, the only safety of the members of the provisional government would be to leave with them.”

These were the letters received at the Department up to and before May 9, when Mr. Blaine authorized Mr. Christiancy to recognize Calderon. From none of these dispatches, and especially not from the *last* one, does it appear that Mr. Christiancy authorized the inferences upon which Mr. Blaine's dispatch seems to be founded.

Nor did Mr. Christiancy's opinion as to the status of Calderon suffer any change since his last dispatch, No. 283, of April 13. After that dispatch his correspondence continues in the same strain, showing on the one hand the popularity of Piérola's government, and on the other the impotence of that of Calderon, and the discredit into which it had fallen.

On April 17, 1881, dispatch No. 285, Mr. Christiancy wrote to the Department as follows:

\* \* \* “Piérola, at last accounts, remained at Jauja, with a small force of about 200 men, but he still claims to be the government of Peru, issues his decrees as such, being as yet apparently sustained by the large majority of the people of Peru.”

On May 9, 1881, dispatch No. 296, Mr. Christiancy wrote to the Department as follows:

\* \* \* “Colonel Lagos, the commander of the Chilian forces here, had made an arrangement with the provisional government of Francisco Garcia Calderon, to allow his government the control of the Custom-house in the northern part of Peru, to enable him to support his government, and the right to send some 500 or 600 soldiers to the northern towns to enforce his authority to this end.

“But some four or five days since the Assistant Secretary of War of Chili arrived here, and the above arrangement was at once disapproved and revoked, and Señor Calderon’s soldiers were not allowed to embark.

“They (the Chilians) encouraged the setting up of the provisional government of Calderon, and from time to time encouraged that government in its efforts, to some extent, but soon began to treat it with contempt, and to cut off from it one privilege after another, still allowing it to appeal to the people of Peru for their adhesion, and to call Congress together.” \* \* \*

On May 17, 1881, dispatch No. 301, Mr. Christiancy wrote to the Department as follows:

“SIR—I have the honor to inform you that on the 14th instant the following appeared in *El Orden*, of Lima, the paper which is the organ of the provisional government of Calderon, viz.:

(English—Official Cablegram.)

PARIS, May 12, VALPARAISO, 13, at 1.50 P.M.

President CALDERON, Lima:

Elmore telegraphs from Washington, saying that the Calderon government has been recognized by the American government.

“If I could confidently rely upon the authenticity of this, I should, of course, at once recognize the provisional government, though no other ministry has yet done so. \* \* \* I must therefore wait for direct official information from my government before taking any step officially for recognition until I should see satisfactory evidence that Peru had acquiesced in the provisional government, the evidence of which I had not yet seen, though for the last week that government *seems* to have made some progress in that direction.” \* \* \*

On May 27, 1881, dispatch No. 310, Mr. Christiancy wrote to the Department as follows:

“SIR—I have the honor to inform you that on the 1st instant I, with every other member of the diplomatic corps here, received a circular-letter, dated April 30, from M.M. Galvez, claiming to be Secretary of Foreign Relations of Peru, under the provisional government of Dr. Francisco Garcia Calderon, stating the installation of that government, and the names of the Cabinet officers; this being evidently written to invite recognition by the diplomatic corps, a meeting of that corps was called a day or two after to consider the propriety of answering. The whole corps agreed that there was yet no sufficient evidence that this provisional

government had become the government *de facto* of Peru, and all concurred in the resolution not as yet to make any reply. Another meeting of the corps was held yesterday, upon the same subject, and while all (with the possible exception of one) agreed that there was yet no sufficient ground for recognition, yet several, of whom I was one, thought it would be proper to acknowledge the receipt of the letter, but in a manner which could not be construed as a recognition. Some two or three seemed to object to answering, because they thought they could not do so without implying a recognition. \* \* \*

“Since my dispatch, No. 302, the provisional government have been allowed to send 225 more men, making about 300 in all, into the province of Junin, for the purpose, as I suppose, of allowing the Congressmen from that region to come to Lima. But this force is too small to prevent Piérola’s congress from meeting at Ayacucho on the 6th of June, as it is reported and believed here that Piérola will bring there from the south at least 1,000 men.

“Such is the position at present. There is no difference of opinion in the diplomatic corps as to the principles of recognition.” \* \* \*

Such was the uniform tenor of Mr. Christiancy’s dispatches to the Department regarding Calderon from the time the coterie of one hundred and ten citizens of Lima and Callao set him up, or as Mr. Christiancy put it, attempted to set him up as President of Peru, down to the day when he received Mr. Blaine’s dispatch of May 9, authorizing recognition. Immediately upon receipt of this dispatch, Mr. Christiancy answered it on June 16, dispatch No. 319, as follows:

“SIR—In reply to your dispatch No. 143 [Mr. Blaine’s letter of May 9, 1881], I have the honor to say that that dispatch places upon me the grave responsibility of determining as matters of fact three distinct propositions, upon none of which have I been able to obtain any very satisfactory evidence.

“1st. Whether the provisional government of Señor Calderon is supported by the character and influence of Peru;

“2d. Whether it is really endeavoring to restore constitutional government; and

“3d. If so, whether it is with a view of order within and negotiation with Chili for peace.

“The first question under present circumstances is a very difficult one to decide just now. If mere money or financial ‘influence’ be referred to this is to be found along the coast, which is completely controlled by the Chilians, and consists of the wealthy owners of sugar plantations and the mercantile class, who seek for



peace at any price and upon any terms. But if by 'influence' or the weight of influence upon political or government matters (which I conclude must be your meaning), then there is great room for doubt, and I am much inclined to think it may turn out to be against the provisional government. It is a very embarrassing question to decide.

"Upon the other two questions I have no ground, except the professions of the provisional government, upon which to decide them; but I am inclined to believe they should be decided in the affirmative. \* \* \*

"But I yesterday had a conference with Admiral Lynch, commander of the Chilian forces here, and with Señor Godoy, the representative of Chili in political matters here, and I found at once that they do not want the provisional government of Peru recognized yet, both saying to me that they had not recognized it on the part of Chili, and that they did not wish it recognized by other nations until they had recognized it. \* \* \*

"This provisional government is not, even as such, a government *de facto* in any part of Peru, except in a little hamlet of Magdalena."

June 21, 1881, five days later on, dispatch No. 320, Mr. Christiancy wrote to the Department as follows:

"SIR—Referring to my dispatch No. 319, I have the honor to inform you of the result of the diplomatic meeting therein referred to. I found it to be the opinion of the corps, 1st, that the provisional government (so-called) is supported by the weight of character and political influence of Peru; 2d, that the purpose of that government is to restore constitutional government to Peru; 3d, that it seeks to restore international order; 4th, that it wishes to make peace with Chili; but, 5th, that the provisional government (so-called) cannot, under present circumstances, be considered a government *de facto*, so as to warrant its recognition on that ground.

"I am inclined to concur with the corps in all the above points, though I still have some doubts upon the first, and am not without some suspicions as to the 2d, 3d, and 4th.

"This might seem, at first view, to bring the case within the principles of your dispatch No. 143, and to authorize (though it does not instruct) me to recognize what is called the Calderon or provisional government. But your dispatch, when carefully considered, may, and perhaps must be construed as having been written with the understanding that the Calderon government was a government *de facto*, of at least a large part of Peru.

"The fact is that it is not a government *de facto*, or in the exercise of the functions of government anywhere except so far as the Chilian authorities choose

to allow it to exercise any powers of the kind, and these are confined within very narrow limits. It has been allowed to exercise, thus far, full powers only in the little hamlet of Magdalena.

\* \* \* \* \*

“Now, on looking carefully at your dispatch No. 143, I see clearly that one of your objects in recognizing the Calderon government is to bring about peace with Chili. \* \* \* \* But I am now fully satisfied that Chili does not intend to make peace with Peru unless driven to do so by outside pressure. \* \* \* On Saturday last (19th instant), Mr. Godoy, the political representative of Chili here called upon me at the legation and we had a free and general conversation upon the whole situation. \* \* \* I could readily see that they (the Chilians) did not want any encouragement or prestige to be given to the Calderon government except what they might choose to give it. \* \* \* It will readily be seen that a literal compliance with the permission given in your dispatch to recognize the Calderon government would be likely to violate its spirit and interest; and before departing from the safe and generally approved rule of recognizing a new government, that it should appear to be a government *de facto*, I think I ought to wait, at least until the arrival of another mail, \* \* \* as in the meantime you will have received other dispatches from me which may enable you to give instructions more applicable to the present state of facts. \* \* \* \*

“No other foreign minister here is willing yet to recognize this Calderon government, and I think I see an anxiety on the part of some of them to see the United States depart from the generally received doctrine of recognizing a new government only when they have become governments *de facto*.

“Whatever support the ‘Calderon government’ may appear to have, it is the settled and unanimous opinion of all intelligent men here, that it would not last a day after the Chilian forces should leave the country. And my own opinion is, that if the United States should recognize it to-day, the Chilian authorities would take good care that any prestige it might gain from such recognition should be more than counterbalanced by the more stringent limitations it would impose upon any exercise of governmental powers.”

After receiving two other mails from Washington and on June 28, 1881, dispatch No. 322, Mr. Christiancy wrote to the Department as follows:

“SIR—Referring to my dispatch, No. 320, I have now the honor further to say that I have been carefully considering the question of the recognition of the provisional government therein referred to, and having received nothing by the last mail in any way modifying your dispatch No. 143, and knowing that I had kept you fully informed of all the facts necessary to a decision, and seeing that the

question whether the Calderon government was a government *de facto* was not expressly made a condition, and that the fact of your having already received Mr. Elmore as the confidential agent of that government, which I take to be a clear indication that you would expect me to recognize that government if I found the facts you had stated as hypothetical to be true, but more especially hearing a rumor here as having come from the United States that my successor would not come here until peace was settled, and, therefore, fearing that my neglect to make the requisition might be construed as a design on my part to delay his coming, I finally concluded, on the 26th instant, to recognize the provisional government as such. \* \* \*

“I must confess, that if left to act entirely upon my own judgment, I should not have recognized this provisional government until it should have become a government *de facto*, or until it should have succeeded in assembling a quorum of Congress, nor until we could have seen whether this Congress or that of Piérola (national assembly) at Ayacucho should represent the most of the people of Peru. But I claim no right to set up my own judgment against that of my government, believing strict obedience to the wishes of my government my first and sole duty.” \* \* \* \* \*

On July 6, 1881, dispatch No. 327, Mr. Christiancy wrote to the Department as follows:

“SIR—Referring to your dispatch No. 148 and to my dispatch No. 322, I have the honor to state that, as I had some reason to fear when I wrote the last dispatch, I have still more reason to fear now that the recognition of the provisional government of Francisco Garcia Calderon was premature \* \* \* yet in view of your dispatch No. 151, as well as your previous dispatches, it is very clear that you had determined upon the recognition of the provisional government, and that I only complied with your wish in making the recognition.

“I fear, however, this recognition will lead to many complications, but I have obeyed what I was compelled to consider your orders.”

These were the views of Mr. Christiancy as to the status of Calderon and these were in his own language the reasons that impelled him, against his own judgment, to obey Mr. Blaine’s orders and recognize a government that as yet lacked all the essential attributes of one.

What the opinion of Mr. Blaine himself was as to the legality of the recognition of Calderon may be judged from the argument contained in one of his last diplomatic notes, seven months after he all but commanded Mr.

Christiancy to recognize the so-called provisional government, and when he was about to lose the control of our Foreign Office, he wrote to Mr. Wm. H. Trescot his dispatch No. 2, dated Washington, December 1, 1881, in which the following passage occurs:

On February 25, 1881, Mr. Christiancy, the United States Minister at Lima, wrote to the Department, as follows:

“A movement has, therefore, been initiated among the leading citizens of Lima and Callao, *and encouraged by the Chilian* authorities to establish a new government in opposition to that of Piérola.”

From this date to April 13, 1881, Mr. Christiancy kept the Department informed of the probabilities of the establishment of the Calderon government, so-called from the name of the eminent Peruvian statesman who had been chosen as President. On that date he wrote:

“In my own private opinion, however, if the provisional government had come up without any appearance of support from the Chilian authorities, it would have had many elements of popularity, and would probably have succeeded in obtaining the acquiescence of the people. This new government realizes the importance of an early peace with Chili, the necessity of which must be recognized by every thoughtful man; while that of Piérola proposes to intend to carry on the war; but it has no means for the purpose at present, and my own opinion is that any effort to do so will end in still greater calamities to Peru.”

On May 21, the same Minister, in a postscript to his dispatch of the 17th, says:

“Since writing the above it has become still more probable that the threat of ‘indefinite occupation’ was intended only to drive the Peruvians into the support of the provisional government, as two days ago they allowed the government to send 75 soldiers to Tacna, Aroyo, etc., to control that part of the country, so as to allow the members of Congress to come to Lima; and it now begins to look as if Calderon might secure a quorum (two-thirds) of the Congress. If he does succeed, it will be some evidence that Peru acquiesces in that government, and if he gets the two-thirds of the members, I think I shall recognize the provisional government, or that of the Congress and the President they may elect, unless, in the meantime, I shall receive other instructions.”

On the 9th day of May, 1881, instructions had been sent to him from the Department, which crossed this dispatch, in which he was told:

“If the Calderon Government is supported by the character and intelligence of Peru, and is really endeavoring to restore constitutional government with a view both to order within and negotiations with Chili for peace, you may recognize it as

the existing provisional government, and render what aid you can by advice and good offices to that end.”

Acting under these instructions, although with some expressed doubt as to the probable permanence of its existence, Mr. Christiancy, on the 26th of June, 1881, formally recognized the Calderon government.

From the long list of dispatches from Mr. Christiancy containing in unequivocal terms information as to Calderon’s not being even a *de facto* government, Mr. Blaine picked out only *one* insignificant passage out of the first and another out of the last, upon which he grounded his action of recognition, and he suppressed all others.

*First*—He suppressed Mr. Christiancy’s statement in the first dispatch, in which Calderon’s was called a “provisional or proposed provisional government.”

*Second*—He suppressed the statement contained in the next dispatch of March 9, showing that the Chilian authorities discountenanced Calderon.

*Third*—He suppressed Mr. Christiancy’s remark in the third dispatch of March 16, saying that he could not recognize Calderon until he should appear to be *a government of Peru instead of Lima and Callao*.

*Fourth*—He suppressed Mr. Christiancy’s allusion to Calderon’s as “the new government set up or attempted to be set up,” contained in the fourth dispatch of March 23, and his remark that the United States could not recognize the proposed provisional government, because *that would be making themselves parties in a contest between the two governments, both claiming to be the government of Peru, before the people of Peru had decided that question for themselves*.

*Fifth*—He suppressed Mr. Christiancy’s allusion to Calderon’s as the “pretended government,” and he likewise suppressed the information contained in that fifth dispatch of March 31, that the mass of the people seemed likely to continue their adherence to Piérola; that the very localities upon which the new government counted, and even Lima itself, showed a marked aversion to Calderon; and finally that the Chilian authorities clearly held the Calderon government in contempt and had not yet recognized it.

*Sixth*—He suppressed the valuable information given in Mr. Christiancy’s sixth dispatch of April 4, that nearly all the inhabitants east of the Andes still adhered to Piérola, and that the same was the fact with the

majority between the mountains and the coast; with other words that through the length and breadth of Peru Piérولا was the recognized government.

*Seventh*—While he made a misleading quotation out of the dispatch of April 13, he suppressed the expressive passage contained in the same dispatch, that the overwhelming majority of the people of Peru were opposed to the provisional government, and that *if the Chilian army should leave tomorrow the only safety for the members of the provisional government would be to leave with them.*

After having made these important suppressions of matters he knew before he authorized the recognition of Calderon, Mr. Blaine resorted to a postscript in Mr. Christiancy's dispatch of May 17 to justify his action. The said dispatch of May 17 could not have influenced Mr. Blaine's conduct on May 9; but not only he made it precede his dispatch of May 9, in the passage above quoted from his letter to Mr. Trescot, but he picked out this one passage, written in haste as the postscript to a dispatch that dealt upon very different matters, and he wholly ignored the contents of Mr. Christiancy's dispatches of April 17, May 9, May 17, and May 27, all of which were especially or mainly devoted to the question of Calderon and showed not only the preponderance of Piérولا over Calderon but also the marked contempt with which the Chilian authorities and all other governments represented at Lima treated the so-called Calderon government.

The suppression almost in toto of Mr. Christiancy's correspondence from February 25 to April 13, and the resort to a posterior document to justify an anterior action did not, and with justice, seem enough to Mr. Blaine to account for his recognition of Calderon. In the passage above cited from his letter to Mr. Trescot he proceeded to mention his dispatch of May 9 to Mr. Christiancy, but he found it advisable not to insert the whole of it, and the public, to whom in fact the Trescot letter was addressed, is not thereby informed in full of its contents. As it will be seen, Mr. Blaine carefully suppressed the first portion of it, wherein he falsely alleged that Mr. Christiancy had informed him that Calderon was at the head of the government, and with equal care he dropped the last clause thereof, which was as follows:

“Mr. Elmore has been received by me as the confidential agent of such provisional government.”

And then this mutilated and garbled dispatch is pretended to be the instructions under which Mr. Christiancy acted.

The fact, however, is that this mutilated dispatch of May 9, as quoted by Mr. Blaine, was not the real “instructions” under which Mr. Christiancy acted; nor did he recognize the Calderon government “with some expressed doubt as to the probable permanence of its existence,” as Mr. Blaine would have it. Mr. Christiancy’s dispatches of June 16, June 21, June 28 and July 6, 1881, set out above are expressive on these subjects, and they contribute a flat denial of Mr. Blaine’s assertion. Puzzled at seeing himself misquoted in that dispatch, No. 143, from Washington, he consults the diplomatic corps at Lima, and after hesitating about a fortnight he finally recognized Calderon. An inspection of his dispatches of June 28 and July 6, 1881, will reveal the real and controlling reasons why, while his own judgment condemned the step, he finally took it, viz.: 1st. Mr. Blaine’s reception of Mr. Elmore as the confidential agent of the Calderon government, notwithstanding he, Mr. Christiancy, had kept the Department carefully informed as to the real status of that government; and 2d. The reception by Mr. Christiancy of *several subsequent dispatches* after the one of May 9, leaving him no option but to recognize Calderon, and forcing him to the conclusion that in taking that dangerous step he was but *obeying what he was compelled to consider as the orders of his superior*. And here it is of importance to notice that we can only infer from the allusions made to them by Mr. Christiancy, what were the contents of those expressive dispatches from Washington received by him after the one of May 9, 1881, and which so greatly influenced his conduct in the premises; they were not transmitted to Congress in December, 1881, and are not to be found on that file.

Mr. Blaine did not sin out of ignorance or by mishap. The willfulness of his reckless disregard of diplomatic usages and of his violation of well-established principles of international law, noticeable in his recognition of Calderon, is shown in his anxiety to conceal his malfeasance, and by the deliberate course of misrepresentation and of *suppressio veri* to which he resorted in his letter to Mr. Trescot, in order to deceive the public. The determination with which he entered upon a policy so fraught with danger for

the country must, however, have been prompted by some adequate and equally monstrous motive. His intimate connection with the Jacob R. Shipherd scheme for the appropriation of the whole of Peru by an American company; the absence from the files of the Department of a number of important letters from Shipherd to Mr. Blaine, and from Mr. Blaine to Shipherd; Mr. Blaine's desperate though unsuccessful effort at a later day to appear wholly disconnected from Shipherd; and finally Mr. Blaine's recognition of the Landreau claim notwithstanding he knew it had accrued to the claimant before he had become an American citizen, if he ever became one (a circumstance which precludes the intervention of this country in that claimant's behalf), are significant circumstances that explain the objects and aims of this tortuous diplomacy, and make clear whatever may seem doubtful or incomprehensible about it. With the prospect, on May 9, 1881, of eight years in the control of our Foreign Department, and the hope, after that, of eight years in the Presidency, the opportunity must have been thought by him inviting to set on foot and carry out the daring scheme which has been openly avowed by the Peruvian Company, represented by Mr. Shipherd, of establishing a United States protectorate over Peru, and of instituting in this country a new East India Company, with Peru as its field of exploitation. To this end the growing power of Chili had to be checked, and, as Calderon, though at first favored, soon afterward was discountenanced by that Republic on account of his disinclination to sign a treaty with Chili ceding territory, the maintenance of such a government as Calderon's in Peru by the United States became equivalent to the barring of Chili's claims upon Peru. For the promotion of the Landreaus and Shipherd schemes, this was a prerequisite. Mr. Blaine's policy in recognizing a government such as Mr. Christiancy represented that of Calderon's to be, and notwithstanding the wishes of Chili to the contrary, jumped in with Shipherd's desires, and was in accord with the interests of the Landreau claimants.

But all this policy of artifice and deception in behalf of the so-called Calderon government was found not to be enough to appropriate Peru for the benefit of the Peruvian Company and of the Landreau claimants. Our Foreign Department had further to mould its policy to the purposes of that daring politico-monetary scheme. Accordingly, Mr. Blaine devised an additional plan which, had it not also failed, would have gone further towards



establishing in Peru the East India Company scheme than any of his previous methods to that end. On November 29, 1881, he issued his circular-letter to all the independent nations of North and South America, inviting them to send delegates to a congress for the purpose of “considering and discussing the methods of preventing war, etc., etc.” So far as this plan was benevolent, it was absurd. Utopists might dream to-day of an international peace; the practical statesman knows, however, that peace, like order, must be enforced, and that where no power exists, or, in the nature of things, can exist to enforce such peace, the provisions to abolish war are futile. Mr. Blaine was not ignorant of this. The benevolent garb in which this invitation was sent out was but a cloak to conceal its real object, which was carefully kept in the background. At about the middle of that circular-letter occurs the following artfully-worded passage:

“Impressed by these views, the President extends to all the independent countries of North and South America an earnest invitation to participate in a general congress to be held in the city of Washington on the 24th day of November, 1882, for the purpose of considering and discussing the methods of preventing war between the nations of America. He desires that the attention of the Congress shall be strictly confined to this one great object; that its sole aim shall be to seek a way of permanently averting the horrors of a cruel and bloody combat between countries, oftenest of one blood and speech, OR THE EVEN WORSE CALAMITY OF INTERNAL COMMOTION AND CIVIL STRIFE.”

Had the Congress met, had it been swayed by Mr. Blaine, and had a plan been adopted to avert *the even worse calamity of internal commotion and civil strife*, the foundation would have been laid for the subsequent intervention of the United States in all the INTERNAL CONCERNS of our sister republics, and among them of Peru. Had that foundation been laid, the doors would have been flung wide open for eternal foreign complications; our policy of peace would have become a thing of the past; at every moment we would have been called in by the under dog in each of those countries, and WE WOULD HAVE INVITED OURSELVES TO BECOME PARTIES IN ALL COMMOTIONS IN PERU, THE SAME AS GREAT BRITAIN HAS DONE IN THE EAST INDIES! Committed to such a policy, the face of this country would have been totally changed. Peace would have fled; an extensive military class would have sprung up, and the fund of corruption that the wealthy soil of Peru would

## *A Specimen of Mr. Blaine's Diplomacy*

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have placed at Mr. Blaine's disposal would have rendered impossible a peaceful reform of our civil service.

[Transcribed by Robert Bills for the official Web site of the Socialist Labor Party of America.  
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